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The diplomatic normalization between Morocco and Israel entered its phase of realization, Tuesday, December 22, with the landing in Rabat of a plane from Tel Aviv. On board, an Israeli delegation led by the Director General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Alon Ushpiz, as well as Jared Kushner, son-in-law of Donald Trump and architect of the American “peace plan” in the Middle East.
The inauguration of this air link is the first consequence of the “deal” announced on December 10 by the American president, under the terms of which the kingdom undertakes to normalize its relations with Israel in exchange for the recognition by the United States of the Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara. For Maghreb specialist Pierre Vermeren, professor of contemporary history at Panthéon-Sorbonne University currently on a CNRS delegation at the Institute for Research on Contemporary Maghreb (IRMC, in Tunis), this standardization updates regional lines of force dating back to of the cold war.
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How do you assess the impact on Moroccan public opinion of the “deal” around Western Sahara and Israel?
The repressive climate, accentuated by the Covid-19 crisis, makes it difficult to express discontent on the part of those whom normalization with Israel hits.
In addition, the Maghreb is living in a real economic bind with the Covid-19 pandemic. These countries are suffocating. Morocco is strangled economically, like Tunisia and potentially Algeria. And the Moroccans have found through this agreement the way out of the trap. They will certainly benefit from aid from Israel, but also from the United Arab Emirates or the United States. It is very important for Morocco.
Moroccan opinion is sensitive to this economic dimension, but it is also sensitive to the fact that Western Sahara is recognized by the United States. For Moroccans, it’s a question of nationalism: they don’t care less about Western Sahara than Algerians. In fact, human links have been forged over the decades with the tens of thousands of Moroccans living in the Sahara.
Finally, there is also a pedagogy made for a long time by the makhzen [le palais] to highlight the links with Moroccan Jews in Israel. Although I think that in the opinion, this dimension does not work very well and that people are rather hostile. Unless there are compensations, economic or nationalist, to have it endorsed.
And at the regional level? Will the agreement redraw the lines of force?
The war in Syria had already brought Algeria closer to its former Russian and Syrian allies. The alliances of the Cold War had replayed. In the case of Morocco and Israel, this is playing out on the western side. Morocco is intensifying its relations with so-called “Western” forces, if we speak in terms of the legacy of the Cold War. And in the same way that Algeria has moved closer to the Russians, Morocco is sort of repositioning itself in the wake of the United States and its closest allies, such as France and Israel. When we look at the long term, we say to ourselves that ultimately, it remains very classic. But we go to the end of alliances.
This will obviously not help relations with Algiers. Especially since today Algeria is not ruled – in any case its president is still absent. And this has been going on for a long time. We see Morocco benefiting from this very long interlude. There had already been the rapprochement with the African Union during Bouteflika’s illness, and now there is the establishment of diplomatic relations with Israel during President Tebboune’s health difficulties. Moroccans engage in international politics while Algerians are very hampered to do so.
What impact can this new regional situation have on internal dynamics in Algeria? Will this strengthen the “tough guys” in the regime?
The tough guys, the nationalists, the most ideological are already in power in Algeria. From Algiers’ point of view, the “deal” will not improve relations with Morocco, but they were already appalling. Nor is he going to fix relations with Western countries, but they were not good either. Nor with the Gulf monarchies. It drives nails there they were already well planted.
And the army – but this is an unknown – will perhaps be happy to be rid of this ball. Because in fact, the Sahara has been three quarters occupied by Morocco for a long time. The Polisario is hosted largely on Algerian territory, with certainly international resources, but that does not create a positive dynamic. This situation blocks the Maghreb, with drawbacks even for Algeria.
But the new situation is not going to change much. On the contrary, the Algerian power will reinforce its classic nationalist and anti-imperialist themes. As much as we have seen things change rapidly around the Syrian crisis with the return of the Russians to the Middle East, nothing has changed in reality in the Maghreb. Unless the Russians settle permanently in Libya.
Can the “deal” around Western Sahara influence the Algerian position in the Sahel? Some Westerners sometimes complain about the duplicity of Algiers vis-à-vis armed groups. Do you think that the Algerians could stiffen themselves more in this theater, out of spite vis-à-vis the French or the Americans?
Algerians do not necessarily analyze it in these terms. They primarily understand what is happening in the Sahel through their domestic policy issues. It is a question of holding their Sahara, of controlling the Tuareg and the thousands of kilometers of borders. If they are benevolent or tolerant with certain groups, it is precisely to maintain contact with the populations and the movements.
Because what ultimately happens in Mali, Niger or elsewhere, I am not sure that they are passionate about it. They have enough wealth and space in their home to control. On the other hand, they cannot allow hostile powers to settle in their neighbors. It is in this capacity that they intervene in this game. If it can annoy the Americans or the French at the same time, very well, but that does not seem to me to be their main objective.
You mentioned the reappearance of “cold war” -type fault lines. However, relations between the United States and Algeria were not bad …
No, they weren’t that bad and that’s all the ambiguity. Algeria’s relations with the United States are as ambiguous as they can be with the Gulf monarchies. In fact, they have common interests, sometimes converging analyzes, but in the end and despite everything, they are not on the same camp. Even if they are not totally enemies, as can be the case with Morocco …
To come back to the Russians, can the new situation around the Sahara push the Algerians more into the arms of Moscow?
What is much more important to the Algerians is what will happen in Libya. It’s more uncertain, it’s also newer. This interests them much more, because it is particularly about the stability of Tunisia. Of course, what could change the case would be for the Moroccans to decide to reclaim the last piece of the Sahara that escapes them. There it might be considered a casus belli for Algerians. And then they might need the Russians, but I’m not sure the Russians would come up and stick their noses in these “internal” matters.
