Do not break, while dangerously evading its commitments: this summarizes Iran's increasingly tough approach, in nuclear matters, vis-à-vis the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) . A few days before the presentation of his report to the agency’s board of governors in Vienna, the IAEA’s director, Rafael Mariano Grossi, was in Paris on Tuesday, March 3. Received at the Elysee Palace by Emmanuel Macron, this 59-year-old Argentinian diplomat, demanding expert in matters of proliferation, confirmed to the French president the alarming signals noted by his organization. "We must bring the Iranians back to the path of cooperation with the agency", explains to World the director.
The United States' unilateral exit from the Iranian Nuclear Agreement (JCPoA) in 2018 compromised its balance and philosophy. It has relaunched the Tehran program, which today has 1,021 kilograms of low-enriched uranium, three times more than the amount forecast in the JCPoA. Confirming estimates by French specialists in recent months, the IAEA says that the level of uranium enrichment has risen to 4.5%, against 3.67% set in the agreement. Mathematically, the increase in quality and mass of these capabilities reduces the theoretical time frame in which Iran could acquire the bomb. This period – or "Breakout time" – was at least one year old, under the Iranian nuclear deal.
Concluded in Vienna in July 2015 in a 5 + 1 format (France, Great Britain, United States, China, Russia and Germany), the agreement provided for limiting the Iranian nuclear program for at least ten years, in exchange for gradual lifting of sanctions. Leaving the United States has broken its transactional character. Since then, the other signatories have been trying to convince Tehran to comply with its commitments, so as not to end in complete disruption, like North Korea. But this is not the path taken by the regime.
Graduated climbing
A second IAEA report – an unprecedented step in itself – highlights Iran's refusal in January to authorize inspections at two sites, considered by the agency to be suspect. "It is for us to verify the completeness and accuracy of Iranian statements on their nuclear program", sums up Rafael Mariano Grossi. Tehran justified its refusal by citing the origin of the information collected by the IAEA: it was allegedly provided by Israel, therefore considered to be suspect. "The additional protocol (existing with Iran, which expands the agency's inspection capabilities in the country) is not à la carte, explains a source to the IAEA. Either you observe it or you abandon it. "
