Jalel Harchaoui is a researcher at the International Relations Institute in Clingendael (Netherlands), a specialist in Libya. He is notably the author of a study on Algeria's perception of the Libyan conflict, "To close for comfort. How Algeria faces the libyan conflict ", written for the organization Small Arms Survey.
As Germany prepares to host a new international summit on Libya in Sunday Sunday January 19, Harchaoui deciphers in an interview with World Africa the renewed interest in the role of Algeria in the attempts at diplomatic mediation around a crisis plagued by an escalation of foreign interference.
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What is Algeria's room for maneuver in the face of the risk of worsening the war in Tripoli?
Jalel Harchoui It is very narrow. Whatever happens, Algeria is not going to officially participate in a military intervention outside its borders. The sacrosanct doctrine of non-intervention will be respected, especially in the current transition period. A polarizing controversy like a plunge into the Libyan conflict would launch a shock wave within the state at the start of Tebboune's presidency. It is therefore advisable not to have too lively an imagination thinking that, all of a sudden, Algeria can embark on a foreign adventure.
That said, several philosophies coexist and clash within the Algerian state apparatus. Certain factions are tempted to follow a populist strategy by instrumentalizing the hatred felt by the population for the elites and the system in place. Other factions are primarily concerned with order, dread reform and reject the Hirak protest movement. This dichotomy is a gross simplification, but it echoes the divisions that exist abroad regarding Libya. Helping Haftar and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) to continue their offensive against Tripoli is seen as an undemocratic act. Consequently, in terms of rhetoric and appearance at least, President Tebboune knows that it is in his interest to appease the protesting part of the Algerian public and therefore to curb any pro-Haftar tropism. However, the establishment as a whole still feels a small preference for the Emirati, conservative philosophy, which explains why Algeria is certainly not going to associate in a way too ostentatious or too intense with the Turkish president , Recep Tayyip Erdogan.
What can Algeria do?
If his room for maneuver is narrow, it is not zero. Algerian diplomacy is awakening. It’s a country with a tradition of foreign affairs. It’s not a featherweight. There is a diplomatic gravity which means that when Angela Merkel invites President Tebboune, the other countries invited to the Berlin conference wonder what Algeria will say. The states invited to the Sunday talks are divided. Every little nuance conveyed by Algerian diplomacy has its importance. Algiers is aware of this. After a long absence, Algeria is orchestrating its return to diplomatic space through the Libyan dossier. There is also a certain opportunism: Libya offers Algeria the opportunity to stand out on the international scene and to be courted there.
Algiers' primary concern is not geopolitical, but economic. Algeria is in dire need of foreign investment and, very soon, will no doubt need loans. From this point of view, Turkey is of little use to it since it is itself in the grip of a serious economic crisis. Meanwhile, the UAE maintains its image of financial racing car. This reputation was confirmed recently when Abu Dhabi announced the injection of 23 billion dollars (21.7 billion euros) into the Indonesian economy to help finance infrastructure and energy projects. The most basic realpolitik indicates that Algiers must begin by showing some complicity with Ankara on the Libyan file, and then negotiate with the Gulf States.
In the meantime, Algeria intends to take advantage of the expertise of its diplomats who have taken care, since 2014, to establish contact with almost all factions of the Libyan conflict. Algeria is a safe, demographic and geographic juggernaut. Someone like Haftar is not going to cut ties with her like he could have done with Turkey. Or be contemptuous, as with Tunisia.
How does Algeria perceive the risk of Turkish intervention in Libya?
We must mention the last session of the Arab League convened in emergency on December 31, 2019 by Egypt, which holds the presidency this year. The text pushed by Cairo stated in substance that foreign interference is absolutely unacceptable in Libya, especially that of Turkey. However, this draft text completely failed in the face of a competing text supported by Algiers, which succeeded in rallying in its camp many Arab entities, including Palestine, Iraq, Tunisia and even Sudan. This version had a subtle nuance, but with important ramifications. What Algeria has made accept is that all foreign interference in Libya is unacceptable. I think this is an excellent summary of the Algerian attitude. An alignment is taking shape on this ultimately quite pragmatic spirit, against the pretense denying the reality of the UAE’s military intervention alongside Haftar. However, this is the position of Paris and even Washington.
The reason why German Chancellor Angela Merkel has lost so many precious weeks in preparation for the Berlin summit is that her original idea was to deal with UAE violations in the same way as Turkish violations. The German initiative was slowed down and somewhat distorted this fall, because there was resistance from the French and, to a lesser extent, some very accommodating inertia from the Americans. The two countries refuse to voice any criticism of the UAE. So ultimately Merkel's camp will be reinforced by the Algerian presence. It is with this little difference that Algeria intends to express itself. Note that the failed Moscow summit on January 13 revealed that Russia was rather tempted to lean somewhat toward the Turkish position on Libya. This would suggest a Russian-Algerian alignment in Berlin.
Is Algerian support for Turkey possible if Haftar were to persist in his ambition to conquer Tripoli?
At first, some feared that Turkish F16s would take off from Tunisia to Libya. None of this will be done, and certainly never on Algerian soil. Concretely, as long as Turkey is not the most aggressive, or the most brutal, part in the theater of Tripolitania, Algeria will probably tolerate it, or even help it a little, from the point of view intelligence, diplomatic action and also perhaps on certain non-lethal logistical issues. Because Haftar is seen by Algiers as synonymous with a long urban war in Tripoli, there is a kind of accommodation with the Turks. Especially since the Turkish presence in Libya is for the moment limited and focused on the defense of Tripoli. On the other hand, if Turkey were to achieve several victories in a row tomorrow and gain a position of supremacy in Tripolitania, I can guarantee you that the Algerians would turn against its presence.
How does Algeria perceive Haftar?
When Haftar started his campaign in May 2014, Algeria viewed him favorably, disliking Tripoli's Islamist militias at all. In May 2014, just before the start of the famous "Al-Karama" operation (" dignity ") Haftar’s toughest Islamists even threatened the Algerian embassy. When Haftar, then supported by Egypt and Saudi Arabia, embarked on a relatively organized military campaign against Islamist actors in Benghazi, he aroused sympathy on the part of Algiers. Where the pack wounded, where Algeria started to stall, was all of a sudden, in late August 2014, Emirates fighter planes bombed Tripoli airport. This was absolutely intolerable from the point of view of Bouteflika’s presidency at the time, despite his friendship with the UAE. From that moment, the "Al-Karama" offensive scared people in Algiers. The reflection was then: " It does not work like that. Bombarding a Libyan city less than 200 km from the Tunisian border will sabotage all the work we have done to avoid the destabilization of Tunisia. "
The pro-Haftar Libyans sometimes like to accuse the Algerians of being disguised Islamists, of being accomplices of Qatar, of Turkey. There are decision makers in Algiers who like Haftar, it must be recognized. But, overall, what emerges is deep skepticism about it because, in many ways, it is not what it claims to be. Haftar does not have the powerful and regular army that he projects. This discrepancy forces the marshal to deploy strong aggressiveness, to cause a lot of destruction without necessarily achieving his objectives. Algerian antipathy has nothing to do with the ideological question of whether or not one likes Islamists. The Algerians rather say to themselves: " If Haftar claims to have a real army, why can't he advance? Where are his disciplined battalions? Why does he need to recruit so many foreign mercenaries? Why are there so many displaced civilians? Whether in 2017, 2018 or today, there has always been this great skepticism in Algiers towards Marshal Haftar.
Does Haftar be supported by the Egyptians and benefit from the discreet support of the French participate in the distrust of the Algerians?
The Algerians know very well that these states, in the event of a victory for Haftar, will never leave Tripolitania. In Algiers, we therefore think that there is unfortunately an internationalization of conflicts in the region. Consequently, the job of security personnel is to delay this phenomenon by using the means at hand. All this is part of a great fear of the Libyan partition. Because Algerians are obsessed with the possibility of their own partition. When they see the separation of Sudan, the Kurdish separatism, the Libyan problems, they are very afraid that it will wake up inside Algeria a desire for secession. This is experienced as a very acute obsession, a kind of paranoia.
